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The present study investigates the standardization process of contact tracing apps during 
the COVID- 19 pandemic. Due to the epidemiological urgency, and differing from classi-
cal examples in the literature, this process is characterized by a compressed timeframe. In 
this setting, we investigate the role of different standard- setting modes and their interac-
tion through the lens of multi- mode standardization. We find that the processes of stand-
ard setting through market competition or inclusive multi- stakeholder committees proved 
time- consuming and inefficient in addressing the immediate needs during this major global 
health crisis. Multi- mode standardization between committees, market players, and govern-
ments equally proved unable to coordinate a standard. Ultimately, a so far neglected actor, 
namely platform owners, proved to be pivotal in coordinating a widely- adopted standard. 
Our research extends multi- mode standardization with platform owners as a further stand-
ardization actor of proliferating importance given the increasing pervasiveness of platforms 
in numerous contexts. The present article provides implications for the interplay between 
different modes of standard setting in general, and the setting of technological standards in 
crises in particular.
1.  Introduction
There is a strong interest in the literature about technological standards and the process through 
which they are created and implemented (Narayanan 
and Chen, 2012). Prior literature has discussed how 
standards often exist concurrently in competing re-
lationships for years (Schilling, 2002). Even when 
multi- stakeholder committees collaborate in the 
development of a standard to avoid long periods of 
uncertainty (Gallagher, 2007), it may require years 
for a standard to be released (O’Connell, 2013). 
Increasingly, standards arise out of multi- mode stan-
dardization, i.e., through the interaction between 
different paths to standardization, such as markets, 
committees, and governments (Wiegmann et al., 
2017), adding complexity to already drawn- out 
processes.
Crises, such as the coronavirus disease 2019 
(COVID-19) pandemic, can lead to extreme time 
pressure to develop, standardize, and roll- out technol-
ogies. A recent example of a key technology requiring 
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standardization are COVID-19 contact- tracing apps 
(Sun and Viboud, 2020; Ting et al., 2020). This 
technology must be supported by standardization 
processes faster than the archetypical multi- year 
processes, given that delays in effectively combating 
the COVID- 19 pandemic could lead to prolonged 
negative socio- economic consequences (Nicola et al., 
2020; Breeze, 2021). Contact- tracing apps automat-
ically record physical proximity between mobile 
phones (Ferretti et al., 2020), notifying users if they 
were in close contact with an infected person (McCall, 
2020). As network goods, these apps depend heavily 
on mutual compatibility and thus on standardization. 
Studies indicate a need for 60%– 75% of a popula-
tion to use mutually compatible apps to achieve epi-
demiological effectiveness (Hinch et al., 2020; The 
Straits Times, 2020a). However, while contact- tracing 
apps had been used in research settings since 2010 
(Yoneki and Crowcroft, 2014), no common standard 
or deployable solution existed at the outbreak of the 
pandemic in early 2020 (Oliver et al., 2020). This 
dearth has led diverse actors to rapidly develop apps 
and work toward their standardization.
Expecting that standard setting under a compressed 
temporal frame substantially differs from what was 
investigated by the extant literature, we investigate 
different approaches to standardize contact- tracing 
apps. Our analysis, through the lens of the Wiegmann 
et al. (2017) multi- mode standardization framework, 
highlights the difficulties of various actors to coordi-
nate standardization within a compressed timeframe. 
We find that an actor thus far not considered in the 
standardization literature, namely Apple and Google 
as mobile operating system platform owners, played 
an important role in setting the eventual contact- 
tracing standard. An investigation of the role of plat-
form owners, which often exercise absolute power 
over their platforms (Cutolo and Kenney, 2020), in 
standard- setting processes is relevant given the con-
tinued proliferation of platforms in contexts such as 
mobile technologies, electric vehicles, software, and 
multimedia content (Parker et al., 2016; van Dijck 
et al., 2018). Platforms also play an ever- increasing 
role in responding to various crises, ranging from 
health crises (Krausz et al., 2020) to natural disasters 
(Poblet et al., 2014).
2.  Theoretical background
2.1.  Standards and standard setting
Standards are rules facilitating compatibility 
between technological products (Katz and Shapiro, 
1985; Gandal, 2002),1 and thereby complement 
dominant designs (Gallagher, 2007), which 
alone do not imply mutual compatibility (Afuah, 
2003). Mutual compatibility reduces uncertainty 
(Rosenberg, 1976). This is especially relevant for 
network goods that do not offer benefits in isola-
tion but increase in utility with an increase in the 
number of adopters (Henderson and Clark, 1990; 
Shapiro and Varian, 1999; Chen and Forman, 2006). 
An example of this is the video cassette. By the 
1980s, magnetic tapes held in plastic cartridges had 
evolved as the dominant design in the home video 
market, though several mutually incompatible 
standards backed by different market players (e.g., 
Sony’s Betamax and JVC’s video home system 
[VHS]) existed in competition (Cusumano et al., 
1992). An increase in the population of VHS adopt-
ers led to an increase in the utility of VHS, with the 
movie industry and rental chains offering a wider 
selection of titles (Ohashi, 2003). Analogous cases 
include the DVD, the Blu- ray Disc, online social 
networks, or peer- to- peer file sharing (Dranove and 
Gandal, 2003; Lin and Kulatilaka, 2006; Salek et al., 
2010; Wang, 2010).
As presented in the preceding examples and mir-
roring dominant designs, standards can exist con-
currently in competition (Schilling, 2002). This is 
typical for de facto standards emerging from mar-
ket competition (Farrell and Saloner, 1986a; Rada, 
1993; Updegrove, 1995; Lee and Mendelson, 2007; 
Techatassanasoontorn and Suo, 2011; Tamura, 2015). 
They are unlike de jure standards officially approved 
by a recognized standards developing organization 
(SDO)2 or government agency (Farrell and Saloner, 
1986b; Rada, 1993; International Organization for 
Standardization, 2020b). While generally de jure 
standards embody best practices agreed upon by 
expert consensus (McCallum, 1996; International 
Organization for Standardization, 2020a), de facto 
standards do not necessarily embody best practices. 
VHS is a well- known example of a technologically 
inferior de facto standard emerging from market 
competition (Higuchi and Troutt, 2008; Barney, 
2014).
The binary categorization of standard setting 
modes into de jure and de facto standards is per-
vasive in prior literature (e.g., Farrell and Saloner, 
1986a; Rada, 1993; Updegrove, 1993; Olle, 1996; 
Schilling, 2002; Suárez, 2004; Lee and Mendelson, 
2007; Leiponen, 2008; Büthe and Mattli, 2010; 
Bryer et al., 2011; Narayanan and Chen, 2012). 
However, for several technologies (e.g., 3G, Java, 
and FireWire), the standard setting did not occur 
through an ideal- typical single mode, but mate-
rialized when actors coordinated across modes 
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(e.g., Garud et al., 2002; Gao, 2014; van de Kaa 
and Vries, 2015).
2.2.  Coordination across modes in 
standard setting
In this vein, the multi- mode standardization view 
recognizes that whether and at which pace a standard 
emerges, is implemented and subsequently adopted, 
depends on the coordination between actors involved 
in this process (Wiegmann et al., 2017). These actors 
comprise individual firms, industry consortia, stan-
dards organizations, professional associations, and 
government agencies (Leiponen, 2014; Yates and 
Murphy, 2019; Conde et al., 2020). In their semi-
nal work on multi- mode standardization, Wiegmann 
et al. (2017) provide a granular typology of standard- 
setting modes, where apart from de- facto standards 
(i.e., market- based), they further differentiate de- jure 
standards as either committee- based (i.e., set by a 
standards organization), or government- based (i.e., 
set by a government agency). Table 1 presents these 
ideal- typical standard- setting modes – market- based, 
committee- based, and government- based standards – 
and their characteristics.
Unlike this ideal- typical view, there exist several 
relationships, interactions, and interdependencies 
between actors across the ideal- typical standard- 
setting modes, whereby the setting of a standard 
becomes multimodal (Wiegmann et al., 2017). 
These multimodal relationships include commit-
tee and market actors (e.g., Funk and Methe, 2001; 
von Burg, 2001; de Vries et al., 2008; Blind, 2011); 
government and committee actors (Pelkmans, 2001; 
Egyedi and Spirco, 2011; Townes, 2012; Gao, 2014); 
government and market actors (Rosen et al., 1988; 
Funk and Methe, 2001; Puffert, 2002); or markets, 
committees, and governments (Abbate, 2001; Büthe 
and Mattli, 2011; Bakker et al., 2015).
Despite their increasing significance, literature 
has paid limited attention to multi- mode standard-
ization occurring on platforms (Wiegmann et al., 
2017). Here, platforms refer to business models 
utilizing technology to enable various stakeholders 
to create and exchange value within an ecosystem 
(Parker et al., 2016). Real- life ubiquitous examples 
of organizations subscribed to the platform business 
model are Amazon, Apple, Facebook, Google, and 
Microsoft (van Dijck et al., 2018). The governance 
mechanisms of platforms are defined and estab-
lished by the platform owner (Ballon, 2009; Hein et 
al., 2020). This level of control implies a significant 
influence of platform owners on the standard- setting 
processes. For instance, platform owners Apple and 
Google, which in late 2020 controlled almost 100% 
of the mobile operating system market (Statista, 
2020), actively curate and limit the extent to which 
stakeholders (e.g., third- party developers) may add 
their products and services (generally in the form of 
apps) to the iOS and Android platforms (Hänninen 
and Paavola, 2020). In summary, multi- mode stan-
dardization processes are of high relevance for plat-
forms, which are characterized by often complex 
interactions between owners and various stakehold-
ers. Given the relevance and increasing prevalence 
of platforms, it would behoove scholars and practi-
tioners to better understand the multi- mode aspects 
of standardization and the role platform owners play 
in the standard- setting processes.
3.  Method
3.1.  Research approach and context
To investigate the standard- setting process of contact- 
tracing apps in Europe, we employ a case study 
approach. While the methodology literature sug-
gests multiple- case study designs (Eisenhardt, 1989, 
1991), single- case studies are appropriate ‘where the 
case represents an extreme case or an unusual case, 
deviating from theoretical norms or even everyday 
occurrences’ (Yin, 2014, p. 173). This is also in line 
with prior empirical research on standardization 
reporting on single cases (e.g., Blind, 2002; Garud 
et al., 2002; Büthe and Mattli, 2010; Townes, 2012).
COVID- 19 started spreading in Europe in 
February of 2020, and within less than a month suf-
fused to all European countries (Whitworth, 2020). 
From March onwards, the increasing number of cases 
resulted in governments implementing measures 
ranging from travel restrictions to lockdowns (Cohen 
and Kupferschmidt, 2020). At the same time, many 
different organizations were working on supporting 
health authorities’ contact- tracing efforts through 
automated solutions. These ranged from commercial 
companies and startups to multi- national committees 
formed to develop such solutions, providing oppor-
tunities to investigate the different standardization 
modes (Table 1) and their interactions.
3.2.  Data collection and analysis
Our case study on the standardization of contact trac-
ing apps in Europe is based on a variety of primary 
and secondary research data and has been conducted 
in three broad phases (Table 2).
The first exploratory phase (March to April 
2020) aimed to gain an understanding of the initial 
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development process of contact- tracing solutions 
in Europe. In this phase, a key source of primary 
information was Novid20, an Austrian social startup 
founded to develop an app- based contact- tracing 
solution. Novid20 was considered a suitable data 
source for three reasons. First, the authors were 
granted access to various internal Novid20 meetings 
and documents. These documents contained informa-
tion on other solutions, actors, marketing documents, 
pitch decks, app specifications, and meeting minutes. 
Second, Novid20 is representative of organizations 
that undertook the development of contact- tracing 
apps in Europe in the spring of 2020. Third, Novid20 
was a member of Pan- European Privacy- Preserving 
Proximity Tracing (PEPP- PT), one of the two com-
mittees aiming to implement a common standard 
across Europe.
In the second phase (May 2020), based on our 
understanding of the initial development pro-
cess of contact- tracing apps, we focused on the 
Table 2. Phases of research and employed research data
Phase Focus Data and examples
Phase 1: Initial 
observations
• Overall picture and timeline of the initial 
development process of contact tracing 
solutions from the perspective of one of 
the many startup actors involved in this 
effort
• Primary data 
○Participation in more than 50 online 
meetings of Novid20
○Internal documents of Novid20 
▪Overview document of contact tracing 
solutions
▪8 pitch decks for various national and 
international potential users
▪2 diaries of key decisions taken by the 
founder and the HR manager
▪Access to more than 10,000 internal 
messages on the organization’s Slack 
messenger account
▪Access to more than 200 emails between 
Novid20 and external contacts
Phase 2: Dominant de-
sign and standards
• Emergence of a dominant design
• Early attempts at setting a European 
standard through the committee- based 
mode
• Primary data 
○Interviews with Novid20 leading 
members
• Secondary data 
○News reports (e.g., BBC, 2020b; 
Financial Times, 2020b; Reuters, 2020d)
○Medical and epidemiological research ar-
ticles (e.g., Hellewell et al., 2020; Wang 
et al., 2020)
○Research articles on contact tracing solu-
tions (e.g., Abeler et al., 2020; Vaughan, 
2020)
Phase 3: Multi- mode 
standardization
• Multi- mode standardization
• Analysis of the resultant standard and 
how it arose with the involvement of a 
new type of actor (i.e., platform owners)
• Primary data 
○Interviews with DP- 3T co- initiators
○EU documents (e.g., eHealth Network, 
2020a; European Commission, 2020a)
○National government documents (e.g., 
French Government, 2020; German 
Federal Government, 2020; Swiss 
Federal Council, 2020)
○Information released by committees (e.g., 
DP- 3T, 2020c; PEPP- PT, 2020b)
• Secondary data 
○News reports (e.g., Bloomberg, 2020; The 
Guardian, 2020)
○Research articles on contact tracing solu-
tions (e.g., Ahmed et al., 2020; Shubina 
et al., 2020)
Modelled after the matrix data display for qualitative research in Verdinelli and Scagnoli (2013).
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standard- setting process. To this end, we conducted 
a series of formal interviews with key personnel of 
Novid20. All interview participants (Table  3) pro-
vided information on Novid20’s development and 
diffusion efforts and the activities of PEPP- PT. We 
augmented this information using publicly accessible 
secondary data.
In the third phase (October to December 2020), 
heeding to comments received on an earlier version 
of this work, we examined the standardization pro-
cess through the lens of multi- mode standardiza-
tion. Hence, in this phase, the supplementary data 
collection focused on the various actors – market 
participants, committees, and government agen-
cies – and their interactions. We gained key insights 
through formal interviews with co- initiators of the 
Decentralized Privacy- Preserving Proximity Tracing 
(DP- 3T) committee. DP- 3T was initiated by research-
ers at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in 
Lausanne (EPFL); it developed the specifications 
and protocols that eventually served as the basis for 
the Apple/Google contact- tracing standard (The New 
York Times, 2020a).
We conducted semi- structured interviews lasting 
for 20 to 40 min (Table 3). The interview questions 
(Appendices A and B) aimed to collect general infor-
mation about the interviewees – their organizational 
role and experience with standards during the devel-
opment process – and the collaboration between dif-
ferent actors. We collected additional primary data 
from committees, Apple/Google, and the European 
Union (EU) by accessing their websites and the code 
repository GitHub. The collection of secondary data 
throughout Phases 2 and 3 was conducted with the 
broad selection criteria of source credibility and 
expected contribution to our understanding of the 
case. We used Web of Science to identify relevant 
academic literature and Factiva and Pressreader to 
locate news articles.
The various data sources allowed us to apply tri-
angulation (Amaratunga and Baldry, 2001; Maxwell 
and Reybold, 2015) to corroborate information and 
fill in gaps in our understanding of the case. In the first 
phase of the research, we employed inductive coding. 
The second phase relied on a blended approach 
(Skjott Linneberg and Korsgaard, 2019) that mixed 
certain deductive categories resulting from the 
research in Phase 1 with inductive coding, especially 
in such interviews revealing new information to us. 
For the third phase of the research, which was closer 
aligned with the Wiegmann et al. (2017) multi- mode 
standardization framework, we employed a deduc-
tive coding scheme. Table 4 provides an overview of 
the coding schemes and key categories.
4.  Findings
4.1.  The emergence of a dominant design
Actors in Europe had a variety of options when 
considering technical solutions for contact- tracing. 
Countries and territories in East and Southeast Asia, 
which were the first to be affected by COVID- 19, 
developed and employed different technological 
approaches to contact- tracing. In Mainland China, 
the government rolled out a QR code- based solution 
(Kamel Boulos and Geraghty, 2020; Mozur et al., 
2020), while Taiwan employed analysis of mobile 
phone location data (Chen et al., 2020). In South 
Korea, behavioral big data (Shmueli, 2017) was 
pooled and provided to the authorities (Park et al., 
2020).
However, it became apparent that while effective 
in their home markets, these solutions would not 
work in Europe due to differences in data availability, 
as well as data privacy laws and norms (Klonowska, 
2020). Instead, the focus quickly shifted to 
Bluetooth- based contact- tracing apps. This was also 
inspired by Singapore launching the Bluetooth- based 
TraceTogether app in mid- March (Bay et al., 2020; 
McCall, 2020). 
If you consider digital contact tracing, it was clear 
to us that Bluetooth was the way to go. And all other 
proposed solutions in Europe were using Bluetooth, 
too.
 DP- 3T Co- Initiator 1
Table 3. Overview of formal interviews
Organization Role within the organization Interview date
DP- 3T Co- Initiator 1 2020- 11- 25
DP- 3T Co- Initiator 2 2020- 11- 25
Novid20 Founder 2020- 05- 04
Novid20 Managing Director 2020- 05- 05
Novid20 Chief Technology Officer 2020- 05- 06
Novid20 Stakeholder Relations Officer 2020- 05- 06
Novid20 Security and Privacy Lead 2020- 05- 09
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The emergence of Bluetooth- based contact- tracing 
apps as the dominant design did by itself not ensure 
interoperability. Subsequent standardization pro-
cesses focused on the underlying data architecture 
and protocols.
4.2.  Single mode attempts at setting a 
standard
Initial efforts at setting a standard for contact- tracing 
apps predominantly took place within one of the 
ideal- typical standardization modes, that is, market- 
based, committee- based, and government- based.
4.2.1.  Market- based
The market mode of standard setting highlights that 
solutions can be developed by anyone and that coor-
dination happens as the various solutions compete in 
the market (Wiegmann et al., 2017).
Indeed, in March and April 2020, a large num-
ber of different solutions were developed by firms, 
startups and non- profit organizations, e.g., Novid20, 
CoEpi, COVID Community Alert, COVID19 Alert, 
and COVID Safe Paths (eHealth Network, 2020b). 
A review of contact- tracing apps identified more 
than 50 apps in use worldwide (Shubina et al., 
2020). The emergence of different solutions might 
also be explained by the fact that some of the early 
solutions were not immediately released as open 
source, as the process of documenting the protocol 
and providing reference implementations takes some 
time (ComputerWeekly.com, 2020). As the CTO of 
Novid20 mentioned, the time pressure to release a 
functional contact- tracing app prompted them to 
develop their own solution, rather than wait for other 
developers’ open- source documentation: 
We were operating under time pressure. Nobody 
could know how the COVID- 19 crises would develop. 
For us, waiting for a standard was not a scenario that 
we considered. Rather, we built something based on 
our existing technological capabilities while ensur-
ing the flexibility to adopt future standards.
 Novid20 CTO
An interesting situation occurred in Austria, where 
under normal market- based standardization, compe-
tition between the two local market actors Novid20 
and Red Cross would have eventually resulted in a 
de- facto standard. However, realizing the harmful 
effects of competing to become the national stan-
dard, Novid20 decided not to release its app: 
Under normal circumstances, we should have re-
leased our app and let the market decide. We acted 
in the interest of the greater good, since two apps 
would have confused the Austrian population and 
negatively impacted public health.
 Novid20 CTO
4.2.2.  Committee- based
Standardization through committees refers to a coop-
erative mode of coordination involving a wide array 
of stakeholders, such as SDOs, industry consortia, 
as well as professional and trade associations. These 
stakeholders cooperate to define a standard before 
its subsequent diffusion, which aids the standard’s 
legitimacy and reduces uncertainty (Wiegmann 
et al., 2017).
Two committees aiming to coordinate and diffuse 
a contact- tracing standard utilizing Bluetooth were 
formed in Europe in the first week of April 2020, 
namely PEPP- PT (TechCrunch, 2020a), and DP- 3T 
(2020b). 
The key question was what kind of protocol to run 
on top of Bluetooth. We started collaborating with 
a lot of scientists to come up with a very efficient 
Table 4. Data analysis approach
Phase Approach Key themes/categories
Phase 1: Initial observations Inductive Background, solutions, motivations, actors
Phase 2: Dominant design and standards Blended Dominant design, standards, competition, col-
laboration, data privacy, ethics




• Multi- mode standardization 
○Government- and market- based
○Committee- and market- based
○Government- and committee- based
• Platform owners in the standardization process 
○Platform owners as a new type of actor
○Multi- mode standardization efforts
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and privacy- preserving protocol that satisfies all the 
needs of the epidemiologists. This was a goal- driven 
design, not just a random walk in the solution space.
 DP- 3T Co- Initiator 1
These two committees proposed diametrically 
opposed approaches, specifically centralized versus 
de- centralized contact- tracing (Langheinrich, 2020). 
In the centralized approach, all apps are connected 
to a central authority. The central authority stores 
all contact- tracing data, and determines their further 
use and disclosure. Conversely, in the decentralized 
approach, no entity is a sole authority or has con-
trol over the whole network and generated data (Dar 
et al., 2020). Participation in either of the two com-
mittees thus largely reflected support for either of 
these approaches. While hailed by some to represent a 
superior means to coordinate a quick and coordinated 
epidemiological response (White and Basshuysen, 
2020), the centralized approach provoked fears of 
mass surveillance and malicious use of the contact- 
tracing data (Sweeney, 2020; Vaudenay, 2020). The 
ensuing discussion led to a rift, with proponents for 
both solutions openly criticizing the other solution 
while advocating for their own (Reuters, 2020d). 
For instance, when on April 18th PEPP- PT released 
a document illustrating their proposed security and 
data protection specifications on GitHub, DP- 3T 
responded a day later with a detailed critique (DP- 
3T, 2020c). DP- 3T has since then been backed by 
several actors formerly participating in PEPP- PT 
(Bloomberg, 2020; Fortune, 2020; Reuters, 2020c). 
Ultimately, neither PEPP- PT nor DP- 3T were able 
to on their own diffuse a widely adopted standard 
between March and June of 2020 (Politico, 2020).
4.2.3.  Government- based
Governments can also play an important role by using 
a hierarchical position to coordinate and impose 
standards. They can either develop these standards 
themselves or mandate the use of an existing stan-
dard (Wiegmann et al., 2017).
Given the importance of contact- tracing in aug-
menting public health efforts, national governments 
got involved in the standard- setting process. France, 
for example, pushed for a domestic, centralized solu-
tion. To succeed, however, it had to solve a techni-
cal issue that had plagued contact- tracing apps on 
Apple’s iOS devices since the launch of the first 
apps in Singapore, Australia, and Canada (ABC 
News, 2020; Global News, 2020; The Straits Times, 
2020b). Specifically, certain Bluetooth functions are 
limited when the app is not active or the device is in 
standby mode. Hence, for full operability, on iPhones 
the app has to be running in the foreground, limiting 
the use of the device for other tasks. This issue con-
strained the functionality of the apps, and because 
of negative user experiences, threatened the wide-
spread adoption of such apps. France demanded that 
Apple solve this issue to ensure full operability of 
its national contact- tracing solution (BBC, 2020b). 
This request was denied, leading to perpetual inop-
erability of the standard released by the French gov-
ernment (Reuters, 2020b). A similar case unfolded 
in the United Kingdom (UK), where the government 
had decided to develop a national centralized solu-
tion. Citing issues of operating this solution on Apple 
devices, in June 2020, the UK government decided to 
switch to the Apple/Google standard, which did not 
face such limitations (Financial Times, 2020c; The 
Guardian, 2020).
In Europe, the cross- country functionality of 
contact- tracing apps played a large role in plans to 
ensure a safe re- opening of internal borders. The EU, 
a supranational institution with quasi- governmental 
qualities, did not push for a specific standard, but 
took a different role. In early April, it published a 
recommendation (European Commission, 2020a) on 
the use of contact- tracing apps in Europe, pointing 
towards ‘interoperability and promotion of com-
mon solutions’ as an important factor (European 
Commission, 2020b). This was followed by the 
release of more detailed interoperability guide-
lines (eHealth Network, 2020a, 2020b). This focus 
became more apparent, when in June member 
states agreed on interoperability for their decentral-
ized contact- tracing apps (European Commission, 
2020d). The required infrastructure was set up by 
two commercial companies, with the data being 
hosted by the European Commission’s data center. It 
became operational on the 19th of October of 2020, 
when the Apple/Google- based contact- tracing apps 
of Germany, Italy, and Ireland were linked to the sys-
tem (European Commission, 2020c).
4.3.  Multi- mode standardization
Actors not only engaged in developing solutions and 
propagating standards on their own (and thus within 
the ideal- typical standardization modes), but also, 
sometimes concurrently, in various collaborative 
configurations across modes.
4.3.1.  Government- and market- based
When governments and markets interact, govern-
ments may use their hierarchical powers to directly 
influence a national standard, thereby preventing the 
prolonged period of competition between market 
actors innate to the ideal- typical market- based stan-
dardization. Beyond the national level, governments 
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usually do not possess the hierarchical means to 
directly influence the standardization process. 
Nevertheless, their backing and support can send 
strong signals to the market (Wiegmann et al., 2017).
European governments engaged in various stan-
dardization efforts with market players. The German 
government joined SAP and Deutsche Telekom in 
the development of a national contact- tracing solu-
tion (Bloomberg, 2020), and the Austrian govern-
ment joined the Austrian Red Cross and Accenture 
in the development of a national solution (Accenture, 
2020). What these examples have in common is that 
governments picked a single solution from the many 
under development in their respective country, thus 
aiming to avoid the usual period of competition for 
dominance among market actors.
While governments used their hierarchical means 
to influence the standardization process on the 
national level by involving themselves in the com-
petition between market actors, two important short-
comings remained. First, national governments and 
market actors were unable to compel Apple to allow 
the required Bluetooth functionality on iOS devices, 
thus rendering any coordinated standard epidemio-
logically useless. Second, the coordinated standards 
were proprietary and not interoperable. Recalling the 
country- like qualities of the EU – namely the free-
dom of movement of citizens, goods, and services –  
interoperability was a crucial design requirement 
from an epidemiological point of view. And while the 
ability of national governments to shorten standard 
battles was limited to national markets, the EU also 
proved unable to hierarchically, or otherwise, coor-
dinate a pan- European standard among the different 
market players in the member states (Kask, 2020).
4.3.2.  Committee- and market- based
Elements of competition and cooperation are com-
bined when committee- and market- based stan-
dardization jointly drive the standardization process 
(Wiegmann et al., 2017).
In the early weeks of the pandemic, various start-
ups and initiatives had commenced working on app- 
based Bluetooth contact- tracing solutions (eHealth 
Network, 2020b). While these actors competed for 
being the first to deploy or enjoy widespread adop-
tion – behaviors characteristics of market- based stan-
dardization (Farrell and Saloner, 1986a; Updegrove, 
1995) – a number of them (e.g., Heartbeat Labs, 
Novid20, and Tourmaline Labs) also joined the 
PEPP- PT committee (PEPP- PT, 2020b). Thus, 
PEPP- PT as a committee differed from DP- 3T in that 
it not only invited universities and research institutes, 
but also market actors already in the process of devel-
oping contact- tracing apps (PEPP- PT, 2020a). As the 
Novid20 CTO remarked during the interview, market 
actors saw the committee as means to coordination 
and exchange, and to gain information on approaches 
being deliberated and developed. Nevertheless, at the 
same time they continued pursuing the diffusion and 
adoption of their own standards. He attributed this 
dual- pronged approach to the impression that coor-
dination within the committee resulted in a slower 
speed of development than in smaller, more agile 
organizations.
Despite the inclusion of numerous market actors, 
the PEPP- PT committee was unable to transform its 
proposed standard into a widely adopted contact- 
tracing app between April and June of 2020 (Politico, 
2020), and by November 2020 the committee’s web-
site was unreachable.3 It thus appears that market 
actors involved in PEPP- PT could not benefit from 
the usual advantage associated with combined com-
mittee- and market- based standardization, i.e., the 
faster coordination of a standard through rounds of 
negotiations between the market- actor stakeholders 
of the committee with the aim of reducing rivaling 
solutions (Farrell and Saloner, 1988).
4.3.3.  Government- and committee- based
In some cases, a standard is the product of interplay 
between government and a committee. In this devi-
ation from ideal- typical modes, governments either 
use hierarchical means to direct the outcomes of 
committee- based standardization, or enter the com-
mittee as a powerful actor (Wiegmann et al., 2017).
Several European countries directly influenced 
or actively campaigned for either of the two com-
mittees, namely PEPP- PT and DP- 3T. Initially, 
governments supported whichever of these two 
committees included actors from their respective 
country. The German government supported the 
PEPP- PT committee, which featured research units 
of the public Fraunhofer Institute, the government- 
operated Robert Koch Institute, and a number of 
public research universities among its stakeholders 
(NPR, 2020; PEPP- PT, 2020b). Germany’s sup-
port included advocacy and involvement of national 
research institutes, as well as publicly hinting at 
adopting the PEPP- PT standard for the national 
contact- tracing app (German Federal Government, 
2020). Conversely, the Swiss government advocated 
for the DP- 3T committee, initiated by Swiss uni-
versities, and ultimately implemented their solution 
in the Swiss contact- tracing app (SwissInfo, 2020). 
Thus, in the present case, governments were involved 
as powerful actors in both committees either through 
national research organizations, or as ardent pro-
moters of a standard developed by committees in 
their respective countries. In this vein, Germany’s 
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health minister Jens Spahn characterized the rivalry 
between PEPP- PT and DP- 3T as ‘a war of religion’ 
(Reuters, 2020a).
In April 2020, the centralized approach became 
the focus of serious criticism due to privacy and data 
protection concerns. The significant impact of gov-
ernment involvement in the committees was illus-
trated by national governments switching support 
from PEPP- PT to DP- 3T (TechCrunch, 2020b). In 
late April, the German government abandoned the 
centralized approach, and instead switched support 
to the decentralized approach proposed by the DP- 
3T committee (Bavarian Broadcasting Corporation, 
2020; Foreign Policy, 2020). Without government 
support, the departure of public research institutes, 
as well as government agencies, the PEPP- PT com-
mittee soon faltered. Yet, it was not the support by 
an increasing number of national governments that 
majorly benefited the adoption of DP- 3T’s solu-
tion, but, as presented in the following section, the 
involvement of a new type of actor in the standard- 
setting process.
4.4.  A new type of actor transcending 
standardization modes
Despite the various single- and multi- modal attempts 
at standardization, in Spring of 2020, the market was 
in a heterogeneous state and characterized by an 
abundance of non- interoperable solutions (European 
Commission, 2020e). A major development in April 
of 2020 was the announcement of a partnership 
between Apple and Google to work on an interop-
erable Bluetooth contact- tracing standard (Apple, 
2020a). In the midst of a global health crisis, Apple 
and Google recognized the urgent need for a contact- 
tracing standard, and decided to jointly allocate their 
immense resources to this task (Apple, 2020c): 
All of us at Apple and Google believe there has never 
been a more important moment to work together to 
solve one of the world’s most pressing problems. 
Through close cooperation and collaboration with 
developers, governments, and public health provid-
ers, we hope to harness the power of technology to 
help countries around the world slow the spread of 
COVID-19 and accelerate the return of everyday life.
The Google Apple Exposure Notification solution 
provides a standard protocol for Bluetooth contact- 
tracing apps on mobile devices running iOS and 
Android (TechCrunch, 2020c). A major technical 
challenge experienced by committees, govern-
ments, and firms engaged in standardization efforts 
was overcome as Apple’s restrictions on the use 
of Bluetooth in standby mode were lifted for con-
tact tracing apps adopting the Apple/Google stan-
dard (BBC, 2020a). Additionally, apps utilizing the 
Apple/Google solution became in principle interop-
erable, thus laying the foundation for EU- wide roam-
ing (European Commission, 2020e). While France 
continued to resist the quasi- hierarchical imposition 
of a standard by platform owners Apple and Google 
(BBC, 2020b), within weeks of its release, the vast 
majority of EU member states had adopted this stan-
dard (The New York Times, 2020b; Reuters, 2020c). 
[…] once a standard has been developed by the two 
players that control the platform, which is what Apple 
and Google do in mobile phones, then it doesn’t re-
ally matter what you want, it only matters what they 
want. France hasn’t yet conceded that, but that is the 
reality.
 DP- 3T Co- Initiator 2
The abrupt end of solution heterogeneity in Europe 
resulting from Apple and Google coordinating an 
interoperable standard highlights the government- 
like qualities innate to platform owners. Further, 
France’s futile attempts to impose its own standard 
on Apple (Financial Times, 2020a) and the UK’s 
departure from its own solution in favor of Apple 
and Google (Financial Times, 2020c), reveal quali-
ties that go beyond the hierarchical means of govern-
ments, which are typically limited to their territories 
(Wiegmann et al., 2017). 
You could not build a contact tracing app on iOS 
without Apple’s involvement, because of the security 
and privacy features of the system.
 DP- 3T Co- Initiator 2
A specific diversion from extant descriptions of 
the government- based standardization mode per-
tains the ability of platform owners acting as 
quasi- governments on their platforms, and thus exer-
cising powers over actual national governments. For 
instance, in its contact- tracing terms of service, Apple 
and Google place restrictions on any repurposing of 
data by national governments beyond the use scope 
unilaterally permitted by the two platform owners in 
the first place (Apple, 2020b; Google, 2020).
4.4.1.  Multi- mode standardization between 
platform and committee
Apple and Google did not develop the contact- 
tracing standard on their own. Rather, it was DP- 3T, 
which laid the foundations and approached Apple 
and Google with the aim of jointly coordinating a 
standard: 
© 2021 The Authors. R&D Management published by RADMA and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
Multi- mode standardization under extreme time- pressure
R&D Management 2021 11
We approached Apple and Google through our con-
tacts, and send them a message – which was really a 
redundant message – that the two of them would have 
to work together so that there would be a solution 
that worked for all phones. We pushed our solution, 
which was at that point developed and published. 
And it turns out that because of Apple’s fairly strong 
position in favor of privacy, this was the more fa-
vored solution to them than the centralized protocol. 
They evaluated the two approaches and decided that 
they would go with the DP- 3T solution.
 DP- 3T Co- Initiator 2
This resulting standard is the product of collabora-
tion between DP- 3T and Apple and Google, who 
worked together on integrating their proposed decen-
tralized standard into an earlier unreleased version of 
the Apple/Google standard (DP- 3T, 2020a). 
The original Apple/Google solution had some differ-
ences we did not consider as advantageous. And we 
worked with them and pushed them to implement a 
few other things.
 DP- 3T Co- Initiator 2
The decision- making processes within Apple and 
Google are not publicly disclosed, and neither is 
there a formal and transparent process by which 
other actors (i.e., market players, committees, or 
governments) can participate in the standard- setting 
process. While in this specific case, DP- 3T was able 
to convince Apple and Google of their solution from 
a technological and epidemiological standpoint, no 
formal mechanism of coordination existed, pointing 
to limited avenues of influence and low inclusiveness.
5.  Discussion
During the early phase of the COVID- 19 outbreak 
in Asia, different approaches to contact- tracing 
were pursued. These ranged from GPS tracking, QR 
Codes, and big data analytics, to Bluetooth- based 
apps. When COVID- 19 reached Europe, Bluetooth- 
based contact- tracing apps quickly emerged as the 
dominant design. The time pressure to release a 
working contact- tracing solution caused market 
actors to commence immediate, and at the same time 
uncoordinated, development. This led to the creation 
of a multitude of similar, yet mutually incompati-
ble solutions. Our observations in this initial phase 
concur with characterizations of the market- based 
standardization mode in prior literature: standard-
ization requires long periods of time, resulting in 
major uncertainty over which solution to back. In 
the pandemic, prolonged standard- setting processes 
and technological uncertainty would have had neg-
ative epidemiological and socioeconomic effects. 
Ultimately, the market did not have the opportunity 
to coordinate a standard, as market actors were out-
paced by Apple’s and Google’s sudden entrance to 
the standardization process.
In prior examples, such as USB (O’Connell, 
2013), wireless LAN (Hayes, 1991), and JPEG 
(Graham et al., 2018), committees played an import-
ant role. These commonly involve competing firms 
and techno- scientific organizations coordinating 
standards before products are developed and mar-
keted (Jakobs et al., 2001; Gallagher, 2007). While 
the setting of standards through this mode bene-
fits from legitimacy and network effects through 
the involvement of multiple stakeholders (Koppell, 
2010), efforts can take years to result in a standard. 
In the case of contact- tracing apps in Europe, this 
slower speed of coordination caused market actors 
(e.g., app startups) to continue promoting their 
own solutions rather than rally behind a committee. 
Eventually, and analogous to the market mode, com-
mittees did not have the opportunity to coordinate a 
standard. The sudden entrance of Apple and Google 
to the standardization process simply outpaced com-
mittee efforts to coordinate a standard. Beyond these 
time- related obstacles, conflict between two com-
mittees, PEPP- PT and DP- 3T, and varying support 
of governments also contributed to a failure to set a 
standard through the committee- based mode. This is 
noteworthy, as these two committees were seen by 
many to possess more legitimacy due to their wide 
representation and were expected to raise fewer 
concerns regarding data protection and privacy than 
commercial actors.
Governments can impose newly developed or 
existing standards by virtue of their hierarchical 
position (Wiegmann et al., 2017). In the present case, 
countries such as the UK and France developed their 
own proprietary solutions, while other governments, 
sometimes in addition to their own developments, 
backed the emerging committees. Ultimately, the 
involvement of governments was not substantial in 
the setting of a common standard, as they were con-
strained by technical limitations and outpaced by 
Apple and Google entering the process. Their role 
on both national and supra- national levels became 
crucial only once a standard had been set by platform 
owners Apple and Google. Specifically, the EU and 
national authorities then focused on linking individ-
ual apps to national health infrastructure and across 
member states.
Prior literature on standard setting shows that 
often standards are not set through a single mode, 
© 2021 The Authors. R&D Management published by RADMA and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
Klaus Marhold and Jan Fell
12 R&D Management 2021
but through the interaction of multiple actors and 
mechanisms (e.g., Blind, 2002; Townes, 2012). The 
present case also highlights such avenues of collab-
oration and interplay between different modes. In 
the initial phase, it was especially the interaction 
between governments and the market, as individual 
governments either pushed for their own solutions 
or backed, mostly local, market players. The market- 
based actors in some cases collaborated with the 
emerging committees in order to gain insights and 
affect the development of a standard. However, ulti-
mately these efforts at multi- mode standardization by 
known actors (Table 1) were not successful. Rather, 
they were outpaced by the speed with which plat-
form owners Apple and Google collaborated on and 
ultimately set a standard with the DP- 3T committee. 
This immediately solved prior technical limitations 
and resulted in a standard widely adopted by the var-
ious developers of contact- tracing apps throughout 
Europe.
When comparing the role Apple and Google 
played in this process to ideal- typical actors (Table 1), 
they do not appear to fit in any of the established cat-
egories. As we show in Table 5, as private companies 
they align with the market- based mode of standard-
ization. Yet, in terms of the coordination mechanism, 
the standard was neither reached through market 
competition, nor through the consensus characteris-
tic of the committee- based mode. Rather the standard 
was ‘forced’ upon the public and private developers 
of contact- tracing apps by the platform owners. This 
is highlighted by the example of Apple refusing to 
accommodate the French government’s solution, and 
making it clear that only the Apple/Google standard 
can be used. This is clearly in line with how gov-
ernments are setting standards hierarchically. What 
grants Apple and Google this power is their abso-
lute control over the platform. In this case, iOS and 
Android jointly hold an almost 100% market share. 
Within their platforms, the owners act as quasi- 
governments. However, unlike the government- based 
mode of standardization, inclusiveness in the stan-
dard setting process is low and there typically exist 
no formal avenues of influence. The observed char-
acteristics of platform owners in the present case, as 
well as their behavior in the standard- setting process, 
clearly deviate from all actors and modes described 
in the extant literature. This highlights that platform 
owners should be seen as a distinct standardization 
actor. Moreover, platform owner- based standardiza-
tion should be considered as a fourth major mode of 
standardization. We also show that in this case multi- 
mode standardization played a major role as the 
platform owners cooperated with a committee, and 
that especially in complex cases of standardizations, 
a single mode of standardization is often not feasi-
ble. And while time pressure was not causal in the 
ultimate success of platform owner- based standard-
ization, it was time pressure from the perspective of 
epidemiological urgency during a public health cri-
sis with its ancillary negative socioeconomic effect 
that was causal in the entry of Apple and Google to 
the standardization process in the first place (Apple, 
2020c).
Table 5. Characteristics of a platform owner- based of mode of standardization
Platform owner- based
Relationships between actors
Coordination mechanism Solutions intended as a standard can come from various 
sources. Coordination through platform owners using their 
hierarchical position to impose these standards’ use on 
others
Timing of coordination Coordination takes place at either or a combination of standard 
development, diffusion, or when a standard has already been 
developed by another party
Main actors driving the standardization process Predominantly private: Individual platform owners developing 
standards and/or supporting and then enforcing their use
Avenues of influence Extremely limited, anti- trust laws and regulations
Inclusiveness in standard development Low, typically internal decision- making processes of platform 
owners
Authors’ own work, characteristics obtained from Wiegmann et al. (2017).
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6.  Conclusion
6.1.  Contributions
We investigated a unique case of standardization, 
in which a technology with wide- reaching conse-
quences was developed, and a standard was set in the 
extremely compressed timeframe of a few months. 
This setting adds to the literature on standardiza-
tion, which typically has focused on cases with 
longer timeframes (e.g., von Burg, 2001; Funk and 
Methe, 2001; Blind, 2011). We show that under time 
pressure, market- based standardization was not an 
effective mode of standardization. And while prior 
literature has indicated that in the given circum-
stances, committees with their inclusive develop-
ment process should have had major advantages in 
terms of legitimacy (Tamm Hallström and Boström, 
2010; Botzem and Dobusch, 2012), the present case 
is atypical in that neither of the involved committees 
was able to independently coordinate a standard.
We also contribute to recent literature on multi- mode 
standardization (Wiegmann et al., 2017). Specifically, 
we identified a case allowing for the observation of 
numerous configurations of multi- mode standardiza-
tion in a single, time- compressed case. We highlight 
the efforts and failures of these multi- mode attempts, 
and point to the important role of platform owners in 
the outcome of this standardization process. Platform 
owners fall outside of the previously discussed actors 
and modes of standardization, and represent a com-
pletely new category, that given their increasing preva-
lence, will rise in importance.
6.2.  Policy implications
Concerning future crises, decision- makers in gov-
ernments must embrace technology as a central tool. 
This technology should include mobile and wear-
able devices of citizens to leveraging ubiquitous and 
pervasive computing resources. Our research shows 
that, under time pressure, the market cannot solve 
standardization- related issues. Hence, governments 
must devise a policy for standard- setting for future 
crisis situations. This policy should clarify the fol-
lowing questions: Who sets the standards? Which 
parties are invited to provide technological solutions? 
Whom does the government endorse and by which 
process? Governments should embrace regional 
exchanges on their standard- setting policies to ensure 
mutual compatibility during crises. This is relevant 
for single market entities, such as the EU, and other 
regional blocs, such as the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations or the African Union. Regarding the 
increasing importance of mobile operating platforms 
in disaster and crisis response (Manso and Manso, 
2013; Tan et al., 2017), our results should prompt 
governments to involve platform owners as central 
actors in the standardization process.
In the context of COVID- 19, the standardization of 
technological responses remains crucial. For exam-
ple, electronic vaccination certificates, an important 
tool in the post- vaccination phase of the pandemic, 
pose standardization challenges analogous to contact 
tracing apps (Marhold and Fell, 2021).
6.3.  Limitations and directions for further 
research
Our research is focused on time pressure during a 
crisis acting on the involved entities and the coordi-
nation of a standard. Within the stream of standard-
ization literature, our case is atypical as it unfolded 
in the course of only months, rather than years. We 
expect future research to investigate other cases in 
which the timeframe differs from established litera-
ture to provide additional insights into standard set-
ting in crises and other situations characterized by a 
high level of time pressure. Beyond that, time and 
temporal aspects provide a number of perspectives 
for future research. For instance, the startups and 
committees in our case study could be investigated 
from the perspective of temporary organizing (see 
Bakker et al., 2016). In this vein, we envision future 
research addressing how the work of the diverse ad- 
hoc organizations not part of the eventual Apple/
Google standard – likely in the tens of thousands of 
staff hours – can be captured beyond these organiza-
tions’ eventual temporal demise for both future crisis 
preparedness and utilization in analogous markets.
Given the nature of the crisis and response, some 
of the insights may not be generalized. Unlike other 
technologies, contact- tracing apps, as a software, 
can be updated to accommodate new standards. To 
generalize the results, we expect future research to 
investigate the role of platform owners in the stan-
dardization process in various settings and from var-
ious perspectives, such as the avenues of influence 
for the platform users and how this role could affect 
innovation (Eaton, 2016).
Ethics statement
The present research has received approval through 
an ethics review process by the University Senate 
Research Committee at the first author’s institution 
of affiliation. No conflicting interests were reported 
by the authors.
© 2021 The Authors. R&D Management published by RADMA and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
Klaus Marhold and Jan Fell
14 R&D Management 2021
Acknowledgements
The authors thank the editors and two anonymous 
reviewers for their insightful and valuable sugges-
tions. The authors also gratefully acknowledge the 
comments received from Nikolaus Franke, Peter 
Keinz and Jyun- Cheng Wang on an earlier version of 
the manuscript.
References
Abbate, J. (2001) Government, business, and the making 
of the Internet. Business History Review, 75, 1, 147– 176. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/3116559
ABC News. (2020, April 26) COVIDSafe’s Effectiveness 
on iPhone in Question as Government Releases 
Coronavirus Contact Tracing App. Retrieved from 
https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020- 04- 26/coron aviru s- 
traci ng- app- covid safe- apple - iphon e- covid - 19/12187448
Abeler, J., Bäcker, M., Buermeyer, U., and Zillessen, H. 
(2020) COVID- 19 contact tracing and data protection 
can go together. JMIR Mhealth Uhealth, 8, 4, e19359. 
https://doi.org/10.2196/19359
Accenture. (2020) “Stopp Corona” App. Retrieved from 
https://www.accen ture.com/us- en/case- studi es/publi c- 
servi ce/stopp - coron a- app
Afuah, A. (2003) Innovation Management. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.
Ahmed, N., Michelin, R.A., Xue, W., Ruj, S., Malaney, R., 
Kanhere, S.S., Seneviratne, A., Hu, W., Janicke, H., and 
Jha, S.K. (2020) A survey of COVID- 19 contact trac-
ing apps. IEEE Access, 8, 134577– 134601. https://doi.
org/10.1109/ACCESS.2020.3010226
Amaratunga, D. and Baldry, D. (2001) Case study method-
ology as a means of theory building: performance mea-
surement in facilities management organisations. Work 
Study, 50, 3, 95– 105. https://doi.org/10.1108/00438 02011 
0389227
Apple. (2020a) Apple and Google Partner on COVID- 19 
Contact Tracing Technology. Retrieved from https://
web.archi ve.org/web/20200 41400 4834/https://www.
apple.com/newsr oom/2020/04/apple - and- googl e- partn 
er- on- covid - 19- conta ct- traci ng- techn ology/
Apple. (2020b) Exposure Notification APIs Addendum. 
Retrieved from https://devel oper.apple.com/conta ct/reque 
st/downl oad/Expos ure_Notif icati on_Adden dum.pdf
Apple. (2020c) Privacy- Preserving Contact Tracing. 
Retrieved from https://web.archi ve.org/web/20200 
60916 0509/https://covid 19.apple.com/conta cttra cing
Bakker, R.M., DeFillippi, R.J., Schwab, A., and Sydow, 
J. (2016) Temporary organizing: promises, processes, 
problems. Organization Studies, 37, 12, 1703– 1719. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/01708 40616 655982
Bakker, S., Leguijt, P., and van Lente, H. (2015) Niche accu-
mulation and standardization – the case of electric vehi-
cle recharging plugs. Journal of Cleaner Production, 94, 
155– 164. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclep ro.2015.01.069
Ballon, P. (2009) The platformisation of the European mo-
bile industry. Communications & Strategies, 1, 75, 15– 
34 Retrieved from https://EconP apers.repec.org/RePEc 
:idt:journ l:cs7501
Barney, J. (2014) Gaining and Sustaining Competitive 
Advantage. Harlow: Pearson.
Bavarian Broadcasting Corporation. (2020) Retrieved from 
https://www.br.de/nachr ichte n/deuts chlan d- welt/coron 
a- app- bunde sregi erung - doch- fuer- dezen trale - daten speic 
herun g,RxEl42Q
Bay, J., Kek, J., Tan, A., Hau, C.S., Yongquan, L., Tan, J., 
and Quy, T.A. (2020) BlueTrace: A Privacy- Preserving 
Protocol Forcommunity- Driven Contact Tracing across 
Borders. Government Technology Agency. Retrieved 
from https://bluet race.io/stati c/bluet race_white paper - 
93806 36565 96c10 4632d ef383 eb33b 3c.pdf
BBC. (2020a) Apple and Google Accelerate Coronavirus 
Contact Tracing Apps Plan. Retrieved from https://web.
archi ve.org/web/20201 20305 0833/https://www.bbc.
com/news/techn ology - 52415593
BBC. (2020b) Coronavirus: Apple and France in Stand- 
Off Over Contact- Tracing App. Retrieved from https://
www.bbc.com/news/techn ology - 52366129
Blind, K. (2002) Driving forces for standardiza-
tion at standardization development organizations. 
Applied Economics, 34, 16, 1985– 1998. https://doi.
org/10.1080/00036 84011 0111158
Blind, K. (2011) An economic analysis of standards com-
petition: the example of the ISO ODF and OOXML 
standards. Telecommunications Policy, 35, 4, 373– 381. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.telpol.2011.02.007
Bloomberg. (2020) Germany Taps SAP, Deutsche Telekom 
for Contact Tracing App. Retrieved from https://www.
bloom berg.com/news/artic les/2020- 04- 27/germa ny- 
taps- sap- deuts che- telek om- for- conta ct- traci ng- app
Botzem, S. and Dobusch, L. (2012) Standardization cy-
cles: a process perspective on the formation and diffu-
sion of transnational standards. Organization Studies, 
33, 5– 6, 737– 762. https://doi.org/10.1177/01708 
40612 443626
Breeze, E. (2021) Inequalities persist in Europe – and 
COVID- 19 does not help. Journal of Epidemiology 
and Community Health, 75, 8, 710– 711. https://doi.
org/10.1136/jech- 2021- 216796
Bryer, L.G., Lebson, S.J., and Asbell, M.D. (2011) 
Intellectual Property Strategies for the 21st Century 
Corporation: A Shift in Strategic and Financial 
Management. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.
von Burg, U. (2001) The Triumph of Ethernet: 
Technological Communities and the Battle for the LAN 
Standard. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Büthe, T. and Mattli, W. (2010) International standards 
and standard- setting bodies. In: Coen, D., Grant, W. and 
Wilson, G. (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Business and 
Government. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 
pp. 440– 471.
Büthe, T. and Mattli, W. (2011) The New Global Rulers: 
The Privatization of Regulation in the World Economy. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
© 2021 The Authors. R&D Management published by RADMA and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
Multi- mode standardization under extreme time- pressure
R&D Management 2021 15
Chen, C.- M., Jyan, H.- W., Chien, S.- C., Jen, H.- H., 
Hsu, C.- Y., Lee, P.- C., Lee, C.- F., Yang, Y.- T., Chen, 
M.- Y., Chen, L.- S., Chen, H.- H., and Chan, C.- C. (2020) 
Containing COVID- 19 among 627,386 persons in con-
tact with the diamond princess cruise ship passengers 
who disembarked in Taiwan: big data analytics. Journal 
of Medical Internet Research, 22, 5, e19540. https://doi.
org/10.2196/19540
Chen, P.- Y. and Forman, C. (2006) Can vendors influence 
switching costs and compatibility in an environment 
with open standards? MIS Quarterly, 30, 541– 562. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/25148772
Cohen, J. and Kupferschmidt, K. (2020) Countries test 
tactics in ‘war’ against COVID- 19. Science, 367, 6484, 
1287. https://doi.org/10.1126/scien ce.367.6484.1287
ComputerWeekly.com. (2020, March 24) Singapore 
Government to Open Source Contact- Tracing Protocol. 
Retrieved from https://www.compu terwe ekly.com/
news/25248 0501/Singa pore- gover nment - to- open- sourc 
e- conta ct- traci ng- protocol
Conde, F., Li, L., and Huang, C. (2020) Standard setting 
organizations, standard essential patents and FRAND 
terms. In: Liu, K.- C. and Hilty, R.M. (eds), SEPs, 
SSOs and FRAND: Asian and Global Perspectives 
on Fostering Innovation in Interconnectivity. Oxon: 
Routledge, pp. 62– 85.
Cusumano, M.A., Mylonadis, Y., and Rosenbloom, R.S. 
(1992) Strategic maneuvering and mass- market dynam-
ics: the triumph of VHS over beta. Business History 
Review, 66, 1, 51– 94. https://doi.org/10.2307/3117053
Cutolo, D. and Kenney, M. (2020) Platform- dependent 
entrepreneurs: power asymmetries, risks, and strate-
gies in the platform economy. Academy of Management 
Perspectives. https://doi.org/10.5465/amp.2019.0103
Dar, A.B., Lone, A.H., Zahoor, S., Khan, A.A., and Naaz, 
R. (2020) Applicability of mobile contact tracing in 
fighting pandemic (COVID- 19): issues, challenges 
and solutions. Computer Science Review, 38, 100307. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cosrev.2020.100307
van Dijck, J., Poell, T., and de Waal, M. (2018) The 
Platform Society: Public Values in a Connective World. 
New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
DP- 3T. (2020a) Apple/Google Exposure Notification. 
Retrieved from https://github.com/DP- 3T/docum ents# 
apple – googl e- expos ure- notif ication
DP- 3T. (2020b) DP- 3T Documents. Retrieved from https://
github.com/DP- 3T/docum ents/commi t/3b602 4918f 
8980d 2be10 eeeaf 7a43d 6d52b 64a38
DP- 3T. (2020c) Security and Privacy Analysis of the 
Document ‘PEPP- PT: Data Protection and Information 
Security Architecture’. Retrieved from https://github.
com/DP- 3T/docum ents/blob/maste r/Secur ity%20ana 
lysis/ PEPP- PT_%20Dat a%20Pro tecti on%20Arc hitec 
hture %20- %20Sec urity %20and %20pri vacy%20ana 
lysis.pdf
Dranove, D. and Gandal, N. (2003) The Dvd- vs.- Divx 
standard war: empirical evidence of network effects 
and preannouncement effects. Journal of Economics 
& Management Strategy, 12, 3, 363– 386. https://doi.
org/10.1111/j.1430- 9134.2003.00363.x
Eaton, B. (2016, January 5– 8) The dynamics of digital 
platform innovation: Apple’s strategy to control modu-
lar and architectural innovation in iOS. Paper presented 
at the 2016 49th Hawaii International Conference on 
System Sciences (HICSS), Koloa, HI, USA.
Egyedi, T. and Spirco, J. (2011) Standards in transitions: 
catalyzing infrastructure change. Futures, 43, 9, 947– 
960. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.futur es.2011.06.004
eHealth Network. (2020a) Interoperability Guidelines for 
Approved Contact Tracing Mobile Applications in the 
EU. Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/healt h/sites/ 
healt h/files/ eheal th/docs/covid - 19_apps_en.pdf
eHealth Network. (2020b) Mobile Applications to Support 
Contact Tracing in the EU’s Fight Against COVID- 19 
– Common EU Toolbox for Member States. European 
Commission. Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/healt 
h/sites/ healt h/files/ eheal th/docs/covid - 19_apps_en.pdf
Eisenhardt, K.M. (1989) Building theories from case study 
research. Academy of Management Review, 14, 4, 532– 
550. https://doi.org/10.5465/amr.1989.4308385
Eisenhardt, K.M. (1991) Better stories and better con-
structs: the case for rigor and comparative logic. 
Academy of Management Review, 16, 3, 620– 627. 
https://doi.org/10.5465/amr.1991.4279496
European Commission. (2020a) Commission 
Recommendation (EU) 2020/518 of 8 April 2020 on a 
Common Union Toolbox for the Use of Technology and 
Data to Combat and Exit from the COVID- 19 Crisis, in 
Particular Concerning Mobile Applications and the Use 
of Anonymised Mobility Data. Retrieved from https://
eur- lex.europa.eu/eli/reco/2020/518/oj
European Commission. (2020b) Coronavirus: Commission 
Adopts Recommendation to Support Exit Strategies 
through Mobile Data and Apps [Press release]. Retrieved 
from https://ec.europa.eu/commi ssion/ press corne r/detai 
l/en/ip_20_626
European Commission. (2020c) Coronavirus: EU 
Interoperability Gateway Goes Live, First Contact 
Tracing and Warning Apps Linked to the System [Press 
release]. Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/commi 
ssion/ press corne r/detai l/en/ip_20_1904
European Commission. (2020d) Coronavirus: Member 
States Agree on an Interoperability Solution for Mobile 
Tracing and Warning Apps [Press release]. Retrieved 
from https://ec.europa.eu/commi ssion/ press corne r/detai 
l/en/ip_20_1043
European Commission. (2020e) Mobile Contact Tracing 
Apps in EU Member States. Retrieved from https://
ec.europa.eu/info/live- work- trave l- eu/coron aviru s- respo 
nse/trave l- durin g- coron aviru s- pande mic/mobil e- conta 
ct- traci ng- apps- eu- membe r- states_en
Farrell, J. and Saloner, G. (1986a) Economic issues in 
standardization. In: Miller, J. (ed.), Telecommunications 
and Equity: Policy Research Issues. New York, NY: 
Columbia University Press. pp. 165– 179.
Farrell, J. and Saloner, G. (1986b) Installed base and 
compatibility: innovation, product preannouncements, 
and predation. The American Economic Review, 76, 
5, 940– 955. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stabl 
e/1816461
© 2021 The Authors. R&D Management published by RADMA and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
Klaus Marhold and Jan Fell
16 R&D Management 2021
Farrell, J. and Saloner, G. (1988) Coordination through com-
mittees and markets. The RAND Journal of Economics, 
19, 2, 235– 252. https://doi.org/10.2307/2555702
Ferretti, L., Wymant, C., Kendall, M., Zhao, L., Nurtay, A., 
Abeler- Dörner, L., Parker, M., Bonsall, D., and Fraser, 
C. (2020) Quantifying SARS- CoV- 2 transmission sug-
gests epidemic control with digital contact tracing. 
Science, 368(6491), eabb6936. https://doi.org/10.1126/
scien ce.abb6936
Financial Times. (2020a) EU Contact Tracing Scheme will 
not Include French App. Retrieved from https://web.
archi ve.org/web/20200 80711 2154/https://www.ft.com/
conte nt/6f984 5e2- 4c1f- 48a2- be98- 35780 9168aeb
Financial Times. (2020b) How Europe Splintered Over 
Contact Tracing Apps. Retrieved from https://www.
ft.com/conte nt/74162 69b- 0477- 4a29- 815d- 7e4ee 
8100c10
Financial Times. (2020c) UK to Replace Contact- Tracing 
App with Apple and Google Model. Retrieved from https://
www.ft.com/conte nt/819ff 491- 0ae9- 4359- b3db- ed8de 
48330d7
Foreign Policy. (2020) Germany’s Angst is Killing its 
Coronavirus Tracing App. Retrieved from https://forei 
gnpol icy.com/2020/05/08/germa ny- coron aviru s- contr 
act- traci ng- pande mic- app/
Fortune. (2020) Controversy around Privacy Splits 
Europe’s Push to Build COVID- 19 Contact- Tracing 
Apps. Retrieved from https://fortu ne.com/2020/04/20/
coron aviru s- conta ct- traci ng- priva cy- europ e- pepp- pt- 
dp3t- covid - 19- track ing/
French Government. (2020) Application TousAntiCovid. 
Retrieved from https://www.gouve rneme nt.fr/info- 
coron aviru s/tousa nticovid
Funk, J.L. and Methe, D.T. (2001) Market- and committee- 
based mechanisms in the creation and diffusion of 
global industry standards: the case of mobile commu-
nication. Research Policy, 30, 4, 589– 610. https://doi.
org/10.1016/S0048 - 7333(00)00095 - 0
Gallagher, S. (2007) The complementary role of dominant 
designs and industry standards. IEEE Transactions on 
Engineering Management, 54, 2, 371– 379. https://doi.
org/10.1109/TEM.2007.893991
Gandal, N. (2002) Compatibility, standardization, and 
network effects: some policy implications. Oxford 
Review of Economic Policy, 18, 1, 80– 91. https://doi.
org/10.1093/oxrep/ 18.1.80
Gao, X. (2014) A latecomer’s strategy to promote a 
technology standard: the case of Datang and TD- 
SCDMA. Research Policy, 43, 3, 597– 607. https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.respol.2013.09.003
Garud, R., Jain, S., and Kumaraswamy, A. (2002) Institutional 
entrepreneurship in the sponsorship of common techno-
logical standards: the case of Sun Microsystems and 
Java. Academy of Management Journal, 45, 1, 196– 214. 
https://doi.org/10.5465/3069292
German Federal Government. (2020) Kontaktketten digital 
identifizieren. Retrieved from https://web.archi ve.org/
web/20200 40719 3127/https://www.bunde sregi erung.
de/breg- de/theme n/coron aviru s/coron a- app- 1738516
Global News. (2020, May 05) Alberta’s Contact- Tracing 
App Only Works on iOS When Phone is Unlocked, App 
Running in Foreground. Retrieved from https://globa 
lnews.ca/news/68986 91/ab- trace - toget her- conta ct- app- 
alber ta- covid - ios/
Google. (2020) Google COVID- 19 Exposure Notification 
Service Additional Terms. Retrieved from https://blog.
googl e/docum ents/72/Expos ure_Notif icati ons_Servi 
ce_Addit ional_Terms.pdf
Graham, H., Alain, L., Birger, N., István, S., and Jørgen, V. 
(2018) JPEG- 1 standard 25 years: past, present, and fu-
ture reasons for a success. Journal of Electronic Imaging, 
27, 4, 1– 19. https://doi.org/10.1117/1.JEI.27.4.040901
Grindley, P. (1995) Standards, Strategy and Policy: Cases 
and Stories. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hänninen, M. and Paavola, L. (2020) Digital platforms and 
industry change. In: Lehtimäki, H., Uusikylä, P., and 
Smedlund, A. (eds), Society as an Interaction Space: A 
Systemic Approach. Singapore: Springer. pp. 213– 226.
Hayes, V. (1991) Standardization efforts for wire-
less LANs. IEEE Network, 5, 6, 19– 20. https://doi.
org/10.1109/65.103805
Hein, A., Schreieck, M., Riasanow, T., Setzke, D.S., 
Wiesche, M., Böhm, M., and Krcmar, H. (2020) Digital 
platform ecosystems. Electronic Markets, 30, 1, 87– 98. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s1252 5- 019- 00377 - 4
Hellewell, J., Abbott, S., Gimma, A., Bosse, N.I., Jarvis, 
C.I., Russell, T.W., Munday, J.D., Kucharski, A.J., 
Edmunds, W.J., Funk, S., Eggo, R.M., Sun, F., Flasche, 
S., Quilty, B.J., Davies, N., Liu, Y., Clifford, S., Klepac, 
P., Jit, M., Diamond, C., Gibbs, H., and van Zandvoort, 
K. (2020) Feasibility of controlling COVID- 19 out-
breaks by isolation of cases and contacts. The Lancet 
Global Health, 8, 4, e488– e496. https://doi.org/10.1016/
S2214 - 109X(20)30074 - 7
Henderson, R.M. and Clark, K.B. (1990) Architectural 
innovation: the reconfiguration of existing prod-
uct technologies and the failure of established firms. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 35, 1, 9– 30. https://
doi.org/10.2307/2393549
Higuchi, T. and Troutt, M. (2008) Life Cycle Management 
in Supply Chains: Identifying Innovations Through the 
Case of the VCR. Hershey, NY: IGI Publishing.
Hinch, R., Probert, W., Nurtay, A., Kendall, M., Wymant, 
C., Hall, M., … Fraser, C. (2020) A Report to NHSX: 
Effective Configurations of a Digital Contact Tracing 
App. Retrieved from https://045.medsci.ox.ac.uk/files/ 
files/ repor t- effec tive- app- confi gurat ions.pdf
International Organization for Standardization. (2020a) 
Developing Standards. Retrieved from https://www.iso.
org/devel oping - stand ards.html
International Organization for Standardization. (2020b) 
Standards in Our World. Retrieved from https://www.
iso.org/sites/ Consu mersS tanda rds/1_stand ards.html
Jain, S. (2012) Pragmatic agency in technology standards 
setting: the case of Ethernet. Research Policy, 41, 9, 1643– 
1654. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2012.03.025
Jakobs, K., Procter, R., and Williams, R. (2001) The mak-
ing of standards: looking inside the work groups. IEEE 
© 2021 The Authors. R&D Management published by RADMA and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
Multi- mode standardization under extreme time- pressure
R&D Management 2021 17
Communications Magazine, 39, 4, 102– 107. https://doi.
org/10.1109/35.917511
van de Kaa, G. and de Vries, H.J. (2015) Factors for winning 
format battles: a comparative case study. Technological 
Forecasting and Social Change, 91, 222– 235. https://
doi.org/10.1016/j.techf ore.2014.02.019
Kamel Boulos, M.N. and Geraghty, E.M. (2020) 
Geographical tracking and mapping of coronavirus 
disease COVID- 19/severe acute respiratory syndrome 
coronavirus 2 (SARS- CoV- 2) epidemic and associated 
events around the world: how 21st century GIS tech-
nologies are supporting the global fight against out-
breaks and epidemics. International Journal of Health 
Geographics, 19, 1, 8. https://doi.org/10.1186/s1294 
2- 020- 00202 - 8
Kask, M. (2020) Contact Tracing Apps in Europe: When 
One is Better Than Many. Retrieved from https://web.
archi ve.org/web/20200 72710 0030/https://www.berte 
lsman n- stift ung.de/filea dmin/files/ BSt/Publi katio nen/
Graue Publi katio nen/20200 0616_Conta ct_Traci ng_
Apps_Kask.pdf
Katz, M.L. and Shapiro, C. (1985) Network externalities, 
competition, and compatibility. The American Economic 
Review, 75, 3, 424– 440. Retrieved from http://www.
jstor.org/stabl e/1814809
Klonowska, K. (2020) The COVID- 19 Pandemic: Two 
Waves of Technological Responses in the European 
Union. The Hague: The Hague Centre for Strategic 
Studies. Retrieved from https://hcss.nl/repor t/covid 
- 19- pande mic- two- waves - techn ologi cal- respo nses- 
europ ean- union
Koppell, J.G. (2010) World Rule: Accountability, 
Legitimacy, and the Design of Global Governance. 
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Krausz, M., Westenberg, J.N., Vigo, D., Spence, R.T., and 
Ramsey, D. (2020) Emergency response to COVID- 19 
in Canada: platform development and implementa-
tion for eHealth in crisis management. JMIR Public 
Health and Surveillance, 6, 2, e18995. https://doi.
org/10.2196/18995
Langheinrich, M. (2020) First contact! IEEE Pervasive 
Computing, 19, 3, 4– 9. https://doi.org/10.1109/MPRV.2020. 
3002116
Lee, D. and Mendelson, H. (2007) Adoption of information 
technology under network effects. Information Systems 
Research, 18, 4, 395– 413. https://doi.org/10.1287/
isre.1070.0138
Leiponen, A.E. (2008) Competing through cooperation: 
the organization of standard setting in wireless telecom-
munications. Management Science, 54, 11, 1904– 1919. 
https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1080.0912
Leiponen, A.E. (2014) Intellectual property rights, stan-
dards, and the management of innovation. In: Dodgson, 
M., Gann, D.M., and Phillips, N. (eds), The Oxford 
Handbook of Innovation Management. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. pp. 559– 578.
Lin, L. and Kulatilaka, N. (2006) Network effects and 
technology licensing with fixed fee, royalty, and hybrid 
contracts. Journal of Management Information Systems, 
23, 2, 91– 118. https://doi.org/10.2753/MIS07 42- 12222 
30205
Manso, M. and Manso, B. (2013) The role of social media 
in crisis: a European holistic approach to the adoption 
of online and mobile communications in crisis response 
and search and rescue efforts. In: Akhgar, B. and Yates, 
S. (eds), Strategic Intelligence Management. Waltham, 
MA: Butterworth- Heinemann. pp. 93– 107.
Marhold, K. and Fell, J. (2021) Electronic vaccination cer-
tificates: avoiding a repeat of the contact- tracing ‘for-
mat wars’. Nature Medicine, 27, 5, 738– 739. https://doi.
org/10.1038/s4159 1- 021- 01286 - w
Maxwell, J.A. and Reybold, L.E. (2015) Qualitative re-
search. In: Wright, J.D. (ed.), International Encyclopedia 
of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, 2nd edn. Oxford: 
Elsevier. pp. 685– 689.
McCall, B. (2020) Shut down and reboot – preparing to 
minimise infection in a post- COVID- 19 era. The Lancet 
Digital Health, 2, 6, e293– e294. https://doi.org/10.1016/
S2589 - 7500(20)30103 - 5
McCallum, S. (1996) What makes a standard? Cataloging 
& Classification Quarterly, 21, 3– 4, 5– 15. https://doi.
org/10.1300/J104v 21n03_02
Mozur, P., Zhong, R., and Krolik, A. (2020) In corona-
virus fight, China gives citizens a color code, with red 
flags. New York Times. Retrieved from www.nytim es .
com/2020/03/01/busin ess/china - coron aviru s- surve illan 
ce.html
Narayanan, V.K. and Chen, T. (2012) Research on tech-
nology standards: accomplishment and challenges. 
Research Policy, 41, 8, 1375– 1406. https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.respol.2012.02.006
Nicola, M., Alsafi, Z., Sohrabi, C., Kerwan, A., Al- Jabir, 
A., Iosifidis, C., Agha, M., and Agha, R. (2020) The 
socio- economic implications of the coronavirus pan-
demic (COVID- 19): a review. International Journal of 
Surgery, 78, 185– 193. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijsu. 
2020.04.018
NPR. (2020) In Germany, High Hopes For New COVID- 19 
Contact Tracing App That Protects Privacy. Retrieved 
from https://www.npr.org/secti ons/coron aviru s- live- 
updat es/ 2020/04/02/82586 0406/in- germa ny- high- hopes - 
for- new- covid - 19- conta ct- traci ng- app- that- prote cts- priva 
cy?t=16083 64258056
O’Connell, J. (2013) An IT perspective on standards, 
service architectures and platforms. In: Bertin, E., 
Crespi, N., and Magedanz, T. (eds), Evolution of 
Telecommunication Services: The Convergence of 
Telecom and Internet: Technologies and Ecosystems. 
Heidelberg: Springer. pp. 118– 137.
Ohashi, H. (2003) The role of network effects in the US 
VCR market, 1978– 1986. Journal of Economics & 
Management Strategy, 12, 4, 447– 494. https://doi.
org/10.1111/j.1430- 9134.2003.00447.x
Oliver, N., Lepri, B., Sterly, H., Lambiotte, R., Deletaille, 
S., De Nadai, M., Letouzé, E., Salah, A.A., Benjamins, 
R., Cattuto, C., Colizza, V., de Cordes, N., Fraiberger, 
S.P., Koebe, T., Lehmann, S., Murillo, J., Pentland, A., 
Pham, P.N., Pivetta, F., Saramäki, J., Scarpino, S.V., 
© 2021 The Authors. R&D Management published by RADMA and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
Klaus Marhold and Jan Fell
18 R&D Management 2021
Tizzoni, M., Verhulst, S., and Vinck, P. (2020) Mobile 
phone data for informing public health actions across 
the COVID- 19 pandemic life cycle. Science Advances, 
6, 23, eabc0764. https://doi.org/10.1126/sciadv.abc0764
Olle, T.W. (1996) Impact of standardization work on the 
future of information technology. In: Terashima, N. 
and Altman, E. (eds), Advanced IT Tools: IFIP World 
Conference on IT Tools 2– 6 September 1996, Canberra, 
Australia. Boston, MA: Springer. pp. 97– 105.
Park, S., Choi, G.J., and Ko, H. (2020) Information 
technology- based tracing strategy in response to 
COVID- 19 in South Korea – privacy controversies. 
JAMA, 323, 21, 2129– 2130. https://doi.org/10.1001/
jama.2020.6602
Parker, G.G., Van Alstyne, M.W., and Choudary, S.P. (2016) 
Platform Revolution: How Networked Markets Are 
Transforming the Economy – And How to Make Them 
Work for You. New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company.
Pelkmans, J. (2001) The GSM standard: explaining a suc-
cess story. Journal of European Public Policy, 8, 3, 432– 
453. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501 76011 0056059
PEPP- PT. (2020a) Join us. Retrieved from https://web.
archi ve.org/web/20200 50418 2655/https://piped rivew 
ebfor ms.com/form/2e4a1 50c2d ebcc2 2bd6d 5354d e166e 
27747 6810
PEPP- PT. (2020b) Members. Retrieved from https://
web.archi ve.org/web/20200 42417 4257/https://www.
pepp- pt.org/
Poblet, M., García- Cuesta, E., and Casanovas, P. (2014) 
Crowdsourcing tools for disaster management: a review 
of platforms and methods. Paper presented at the AI 
Approaches to the Complexity of Legal Systems, Berlin.
Politico. (2020) Tech Feud Complicates EU Search for 
Coronavirus Tracking App. Retrieved from https://www.
polit ico.eu/artic le/tech- feud- compl icate s- eu- searc h- for- 
coron aviru s- track ing- app/
Puffert, D.J. (2002) Path dependence in spatial networks: 
the standardization of railway track gauge. Explorations 
in Economic History, 39, 3, 282– 314. https://doi.
org/10.1006/exeh.2002.0786
Rada, R. (1993) Standards: the language for success. 
Communications of the ACM, 36, 12, 17– 18. https://doi.
org/10.1145/163298.163351
Reuters. (2020a) European Coalition Takes Shape on 
Coronavirus Contact Tracing. Retrieved from https://
www.reute rs.com/artic le/us- healt h- coron aviru s- europ e- 
tech- idUSK BN22J1N8
Reuters. (2020) France Accuses Apple of Refusing Help 
with ’StopCovid’ App. Retrieved from https://www.reute 
rs.com/artic le/us- healt h- coron aviru s- franc e- tech- idUSK 
BN22H0LX
Reuters. (2020c) Germany Flips to Apple- Google Approach 
on Smartphone Contact Tracing. Retrieved from https://
www.reute rs.com/artic le/us- healt h- coron aviru s- europ e- 
tech- idUSK CN22807J
Reuters. (2020d) Rift Opens Over European Coronavirus 
Contact Tracing Apps. Retrieved from https://www.
reute rs.com/artic le/us- healt h- coron aviru s- europ e- tech/
rift- opens - over- europ ean- coron aviru s- conta ct- traci ng- 
apps- idUSK BN2221U0
Rosen, B.N., Schnaars, S.P., and Shani, D. (1988) A 
comparison of approaches for setting standards for 
technological products. Journal of Product Innovation 
Management, 5, 2, 129– 139. https://doi.org/10.1111/15
40- 5885.520129
Rosenberg, N. (1976) Perspectives on Technology. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Salek, M., Shayandeh, S., and Kempe, D. (2010) You share, 
I share: network effects and economic incentives in P2P 
file- sharing systems. In: Saberi, A. (ed.), Internet and 
Network Economics. Heidelberg: Springer. pp. 354– 365.
Schilling, M.A. (2002) Technology success and failure 
in winner- take- all markets: the impact of learning ori-
entation, timing, and network externalities. Academy 
of Management Journal, 45, 2, 387– 398. https://doi.
org/10.5465/3069353
Shapiro, C. and Varian, H.R. (1999) Information Rules: a 
Strategic Guide to the Network Economy. Boston, MA: 
Harvard Business School Press.
Shmueli, G. (2017) Analyzing behavioral big data: meth-
odological, practical, ethical, and moral issues. Quality 
Engineering, 29, 1, 57– 74. https://doi.org/10.1080/08982 
112.2016.1210979
Shubina, V., Holcer, S., Gould, M., and Lohan, E.S. (2020) 
Survey of decentralized solutions with mobile devices 
for user location tracking, proximity detection, and con-
tact tracing in the COVID- 19 era. Data, 5, 4, 87. https://
doi.org/10.3390/data5 040087
Skjott Linneberg, M. and Korsgaard, S. (2019) Coding 
qualitative data: a synthesis guiding the novice. 
Qualitative Research Journal, 19, 3, 259– 270. https://
doi.org/10.1108/QRJ- 12- 2018- 0012
Srinivasan, R., Lilien, G.L., and Rangaswamy, A. (2006) The 
emergence of dominant designs. Journal of Marketing, 70, 
2, 1– 17. https://doi.org/10.1509/jmkg.70.2.001
Statista. (2020) Mobile Operating Systems’ Market 
Share Worldwide from January 2012 to October 2020. 
Retrieved from https://www.stati sta.com/stati stics/ 
27269 8/globa l- marke t- share - held- by- mobil e- opera ting- 
syste ms- since - 2009/
Suárez, F.F. (2004) Battles for technological dominance: 
an integrative framework. Research Policy, 33, 2, 271– 
286. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2003.07.001
Sun, K. and Viboud, C. (2020) Impact of contact tracing 
on SARS- CoV- 2 transmission. The Lancet Infectious 
Diseases, 20, 8, 876– 877. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1473 
- 3099(20)30357 - 1
Sweeney, Y. (2020) Tracking the debate on COVID- 19 sur-
veillance tools. Nature Machine Intelligence, 2, 6, 301– 
304. https://doi.org/10.1038/s4225 6- 020- 0194- 1
Swiss Federal Council. (2020) Public Security Test Swiss 
Covid Proximity Tracing System. Retrieved from https://
www.melani.admin.ch/melan i/en/home/publi c- secur ity- 
test/infos.html
SwissInfo. (2020) Swiss Covid- 19 Contact Tracing App 
Ready for Privacy Testing. Retrieved from https://www.
swiss info.ch/eng/publi c- scrut iny_swiss - covid - 19- conta 
ct- traci ng- app- ready - for- priva cy- testi ng/45792632
Tamm Hallström, K. and Boström, M. (2010) Transnational 
Multi- Stakeholder Standardization: Organizing Fragile 
© 2021 The Authors. R&D Management published by RADMA and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
Multi- mode standardization under extreme time- pressure
R&D Management 2021 19
Non- State Authority. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar 
Publishing.
Tamura, S. (2015) Who participates in de jure standard 
setting in Japan? The analysis of participation costs 
and benefits. Innovation, 17, 3, 400– 415. https://doi.
org/10.1080/14479 338.2015.1054604
Tan, M.L., Prasanna, R., Stock, K., Hudson- Doyle, E., 
Leonard, G., and Johnston, D. (2017) Mobile applica-
tions in crisis informatics literature: a systematic review. 
International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, 24, 
297– 311. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2017.06.009
Techatassanasoontorn, A.A. and Suo, S. (2011) Influences 
on standards adoption in de facto standardization. 
Information Technology and Management, 12, 4, 357– 
385. https://doi.org/10.1007/s1079 9- 011- 0089- 2
TechCrunch. (2020a) An EU Coalition of Techies is 
Backing a ‘Privacy- Preserving’ Standard for COVID- 19 
Contacts Tracing. TechCrunch. Retrieved from https://
techc runch.com/2020/04/01/an- eu- coali tion- of- techi 
es- is- backi ng- a- priva cy- prese rving - stand ard- for- covid 
- 19- conta cts- traci ng/
TechCrunch. (2020b) Germany Ditches Centralized Approach 
to App for COVID- 19 Contacts Tracing. Retrieved from 
https://techc runch.com/2020/04/27/germa ny- ditch es- 
centr alize d- appro ach- to- app- for- covid - 19- conta cts- traci 
ng/?gucco unter =1&guce_refer rer=aHR0c HM6Ly 93d3c 
uZ29v Z2xlL mNvbS 8&guce_refer rer_sig=AQAAA 
L3qng kr58f 0lY2d cete0 ASwNrr_eh3dx PliKp gzGtq 
GCJWW PCWE_W- PbkDT J38Tv QLL8m jA4ks C6GWz 
BxDY5 ZkUE4 1WhEo V31r5_hSkBY r3w8C ChZyX 7mJ_
eQxw5 zX_AcESX h0tqX d3_AnIiB iZM_eUuxT - x13cT 
qn4I_s9TuAR
TechCrunch. (2020c) Q&A: Apple and Google Discuss 
their Coronavirus Tracing Efforts. Retrieved from 
https://techc runch.com/2020/04/13/apple - googl e- coron 
aviru s- traci ng/
The Guardian. (2020) UK Abandons Contact- Tracing App 
for Apple and Google Model. Retrieved from https://
www.thegu ardian.com/world/ 2020/jun/18/uk- poise 
d- to- aband on- coron aviru s- app- in- favou r- of- apple 
- and- googl e- models
The New York Times. (2020a) Coronavirus Apps Show 
Promise but Prove a Tough Sell. Retrieved from https://
www.nytim es.com/2020/12/07/techn ology/ coron aviru 
s- expos ure- alert - apps.html
The New York Times. (2020b) Europe Rolls Out Contact 
Tracing Apps, With Hope and Trepidation. Retrieved 
from https://www.nytim es.com/2020/06/16/world/ europ 
e/conta ct- traci ng- apps- europ e- coron avirus.html
The Straits Times. (2020a, April 6) Coronavirus: Google 
Launches New Tool to Help Public Health Officials Plan 
Social Distancing Measures. Retrieved from https://
www.strai tstim es.com/tech/googl e- launc hes- new- tool- 
to- help- publi c- healt h- offic ials- plan- socia l- dista ncing 
- measures
The Straits Times. (2020b, November 12) Wearable Device 
for Covid- 19 Contact Tracing to be Rolled Out Soon, 
May be Issued to Everyone in Singapore. Retrieved from 
https://www.strai tstim es.com/polit ics/parli ament - weara 
ble- devic e- for- conta ct- traci ng- set- to- be- issue d- trace 
toget her- does- not- work?utm_mediu m=Socia l&utm_
campa ign=STFB&utm_sourc e=Faceb ook#Echob 
ox=15913 31720
Ting, D.S.W., Carin, L., Dzau, V., and Wong, T.Y. (2020) 
Digital technology and COVID- 19. Nature Medicine, 26, 
4, 459– 461. https://doi.org/10.1038/s4159 1- 020- 0824- 5
Townes, M. (2012) The spread of TCP/IP: how the Internet 
became the Internet. Millennium, 41, 1, 43– 64. https://
doi.org/10.1177/03058 29812 449195
Updegrove, A. (1993) Forming, funding, and operating 
standard- setting consortia. IEEE Micro, 13, 6, 52– 61. 
https://doi.org/10.1109/40.248055
Updegrove, A. (1995) Consortia and the role of govern-
ment in standard setting. In: Kahin, B. and Abbate, J. 
(eds), Standards Policy for Information Infrastructure. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. pp. 321– 348.
Vaudenay, S. (2020) Centralized or Decentralized? The 
Contact Tracing Dilemma. Retrieved from https://eprint.
iacr.org/2020/531
Vaughan, A. (2020) The problems with contact- 
tracing apps. New Scientist, 246, 3279, 9. https://doi.
org/10.1016/S0262 - 4079(20)30787 - 9
Verdinelli, S. and Scagnoli, N.I. (2013) Data display in 
qualitative research. International Journal of Qualitative 
Methods, 12, 1, 359– 381. https://doi.org/10.1177/16094 
06913 01200117
de Vries, H., de Vries, H.J., and Oshri, I. (2008) Standards 
Battles in Open Source Software: The Case of Firefox. 
New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.
Wang, B. (2010) Survival and competition among social 
networking websites: a research commentary on “Critical 
Mass and Willingness to Pay for Social Networks” by J. 
Christopher Westland. Electronic Commerce Research 
and Applications, 9, 1, 20– 22. https://doi.org/10.1016/ 
j.elerap.2009.08.002
Wang, C.J., Ng, C.Y., and Brook, R.H. (2020) Response to 
COVID- 19 in Taiwan: big data analytics, new technol-
ogy, and proactive testing. JAMA, 323, 14, 1341– 1342. 
https://doi.org/10.1001/jama.2020.3151
White, L. and van Basshuysen, P. (2020) How to over-
come lockdown: selective isolation versus contact trac-
ing. Journal of Medical Ethics, 46, 11, 724. https://doi.
org/10.1136/medet hics- 2020- 106680
Whitworth, J. (2020) COVID- 19: a fast evolving pandemic. 
Transactions of the Royal Society of Tropical Medicine 
and Hygiene, 114, 4, 241– 248. https://doi.org/10.1093/
trstm h/traa025
Wiegmann, P.M., de Vries, H.J., and Blind, K. (2017) 
Multi- mode standardisation: a critical review and a 
research agenda. Research Policy, 46, 8, 1370– 1386. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2017.06.002
Yates, J. and Murphy, C.N. (2019) Engineering Rules: 
Global Standard Setting Since 1880. Baltimore, MD: 
Johns Hopkins University Press.
Yin, R.K. (2014) Case Study Research: Design and Methods, 
5th edn. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
Yoneki, E. and Crowcroft, J. (2014) EpiMap: towards 
quantifying contact networks for understanding epide-
miology in developing countries. Ad Hoc Networks, 13, 
83– 93. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.adhoc.2012.06.003
© 2021 The Authors. R&D Management published by RADMA and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
Klaus Marhold and Jan Fell
20 R&D Management 2021
Notes
1 We follow earlier examples (e.g., Grindley, 1995; 
Srinivasan et al., 2006; Jain, 2012) and understand 
that “standards” represent technical specifications for 
quality, compatibility, and connectivity. In our case, 
standards refer to the underlying protocols influenc-
ing and governing the detection and reporting of con-
tacts, and not the app- specific localized graphical user 
interface.
2 Examples of major SDOs are the International 
Organization for Standardization (ISO), the Institute of 
Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), and the 
International Telecommunication Union (ITU).
3 https://web.archi ve.org/web/20201 10605 3030/https://
www.pepp- pt.org/
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APPENDIX A
Semi- structured interview outline (translated from 
German)
1. Please describe your role within Novid20 and 
tell us about the organization.
2. Can you describe the initial process that led to the 
decision to develop a Bluetooth- based contact- 
tracing app?
3. In the beginning, were there any established 
standards or other solutions that you could build 
up on?
4. How did a lack of standards affect the develop-
ment of Novid20’s contact- tracing solution?
5. What is the current situation with respect to estab-
lished designs and standards for contact- tracing 
apps?
6. How is Novid20 affected by standards and con-
sortia? Can you describe positive or negative 
influences?
7. Within Austria, there is more than one organiza-
tion developing contact- tracing solutions. How 
would you describe Novid20’s relationship to 
other organizations developing and deploying 
similar apps (e.g., the Red Cross in Austria)?
8. More recently, major tech firms Apple and Google 
have entered the scene and are developing a ref-
erence solution. How does this affect Novid20, 
and how was this news received within your 
organization?
9. Are Apple and Google considered ‘competition’ 
or a useful complement to existing initiatives?
10.  Can you tell us about the collaboration between 
different initiatives in Europe?
APPENDIX B
Semi- structured interview outline for founding members 
of DP- 3T
Background 
1. Please describe your role within DP- 3T and 
tell us about the organization.
2. Can you describe the genesis of DP- 3T? How did 
the various members and individuals involved 
come together?
Dominant design and standards 
3. Can you describe the process that led you to focus 
on a Bluetooth- based standard? Why not a QR 
code or phone- based location tracking?
4. Did you take any particular country’s solution as a 
role model?
5. In the beginning, were there any existing formal 
standards or de- facto standards that you could 
build upon?
6. What is the current situation with respect to estab-
lished designs and standards for contact- tracing 
apps? To what extent is the work of DP- 3T still 
part of rolled- out solutions/solutions currently 
under development?
Actors 
7. How would you describe the roles of consortia 
(such as DP- 3T) in the standard- setting process for 
contact- tracing apps?
8. Do any other important actors in this process come 
to your mind?
9. Can you tell us about the collaboration and/or com-
petition between different initiatives in Europe?
10.  How do you perceive the role of European gov-
ernments and the European Union?
11.  More recently, major tech firms Apple and Google 
have entered the scene and developed a reference 
solution. How did this affect DP- 3T, and how was 
this news received within your organization?
12.  Do you consider Apple and Google as ‘com-
petition’ or a useful complement to existing 
initiatives?
